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Abstract
We address the issue of promoting synergies in divisionalized, di-
versified firms from the perspectives of the resource-based view and
recent work on corporate headquarters, thus connecting the analysis
of sustained competitive advantage with organizational issues.  We
begin by clarifying the concept of synergy, and argue that the con-
cept of complementarity is particularly likely to capture most
meanings of synergy.  Furthermore, we argue that the raison d’etre of
the  corporate headquarters lies in their synergy-creating potential.
The reasoning is illustrated with examples from Danish corpora-
tions, specifically Danfoss and Bang & Olufsen.
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1I. Introduction
This paper represents a first stab at understanding the role of corporate head-
quarters as sponsors of synergies in divisionalized multiproduct firms.  A pri-
mary argument is that part of the raison d’etre of the corporate headquarters
indeed lies in its potential to stimulate synergies; otherwise, it is better to let
divisions exist as independent firms or have them managed by other firms
whose headquarters can add more value.  Developing this argument requires,
however, a fine-grained understanding of the notion of synergy - one that has
arguably been missing from the literature, in spite of the huge popularity of the
concept.  Thus, we essentially address three issues:
· Research question 1): How should we theoretically understand synergies?
· Research question 2): How, and by whom, are they promoted?
· Research question 3): May we utilize insights developed under 1) and 2)
when seeking a rationale for the existence and functions of the corporate
headquarters?
Our attempt to address these issues is primarily based on insights from
two relatively recent literatures on strategy, firm organization and perform-
ance.  These are the resource-based view on the firm (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney,
1991; Peteraf, 1993) and recent work on corporate headquarters (Prahalad and
Bettis, 1986;  Campbell, Goold and Alexander, 1995; Chandler 1994; Foss, 1997).
Each one of these two literatures stand to gain from being combined with the
ideas and insights of the other literature.  For example, the resource-based view
has not had much to say about organizational issues, such as how corporate
headquarters may influence how assets are leveraged and accumulated.   Con-
versely, the relatively small literature on corporate headquarters (henceforth,
“CHQ”) has not, in our view, fundamentally clarified what it is the CHQ does
or may do.  However, we are unlikely to fully understand, for example, what
seems to be a major wave of restructuring of CHQ (Young and Goold, 1993;
2Ferlie and Pettigrew, 1996) unless we have a precise understanding of this.
Thus, we argue that research on CHQ stand to benefit from recent resource-
based research, for example, into the dynamics of asset-accumulation processes
and sustainability of competitive advantage.   Specifically, we will  conceptu-
alize the CHQ as sponsors and coordinators of processes of synergy creation.
In other words, we will attempt to put conceptual meat on what Campbell,
Goold and Alexander (1995) call “parenting advantage”, that is to say, the extra
value creation that under certain circumstances may be obtained when a parent
firm owns a business, compared to the situation where one of its rivals owns it,
or it exists on a stand alone basis.  Thus, the CHQ may create quasi-rents, that
is, a difference between best and second-best ownership of a business.  In our
view, these rents are in our view what has normally fallen under the  rubrics of
“synergy” or “parenting advantages” (III. The Corporate Headquarters as Sponsors
of Synergies).
Synergy is one of the most common and admittedly also one the most dif-
fuse notions in the whole corporate strategy literature.  As a result, there has
been some import from economics in an attempt to clarify the meaning of syn-
ergy.  For example, the concept of economies of scope would seem to be one im-
portant candidate for a clearer understanding of synergy.  However, as we ar-
gue there is a static dimension to the concept of economies of scope so that it
does not fully capture the richness of the concept of synergy, which - we argue
- should be given a much more dynamic interpretation.  We focus in particular
on the concept of complementarities (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990, 1995) as a
strong candidate for putting precise conceptual flesh on the concept of synergy,
and examine the role of corporate headquarters in fostering complementarities1
(Section II: Concepts of Synergy: A Resource-Based Discussion).
In addition to furthering the understanding of the role and rationales of
corporate headquarters, our discussion also has the potential of furthering the
3resource-based view.  Resource-based thought has clarified that firms are con-
strained in their ability to reap sustained competitive advantages from resour-
ces that can be acquired on a market (Dierickx and Cool, 1989).2  Therefore the
attention has been increasingly focused on internal processes of asset-accumu-
lation as means to keep competitive advantage sustainable.   This implies that
the process by which assets stocks are in fact accumulated  and  the factors and
mechanisms that hinder or ease asset accumulation ought to receive substantial
analytical attention within resource-based thought.   Assuredly, in this context
the role of the corporate headquarters should not be neglected.  Our general
impression, however, is that the need for connecting organizational factors and
asset-accumulation processes is not a generally recognized one. The situation
may be slowly changing3, but so far this literature has been silent on the role of
corporate headquarters.
II. Concepts of Synergy: A Resource-Based Discussion
A. The Meanings of Synergy
Much research effort has been devoted to understanding what keeps divisio-
nalized, multiproduct firms together.   Recent research exemplified by concepts
such as “dominant logic” (Prahalad and Bettis, 1986), “core competence” (Prahalad
and Hamel, 1990), “organizational knowledge structures” (Lyles and Schwenk,
                                                                                                                                         
1  Notably, Michael Porter (1996) has recently focused in on complementarity as a crucial con-
cept in strategy thinking.
2 The argument does not amount to the denial of the general possibility of obtaining sustained
competitive advantages from tradeable inputs (cf. Barney, 1986); this is completely dependent
upon specific assumptions with respect to the distribution of market power and information.
Rather, the argument is the more subtle one that there is in general a greater potential for SCA
associated with internally accumulated asset stocks than with tradeable resources, simply be-
cause there is no direct trading process here that promotes a tendency towards the equalizati-
on of supply and demand price on the relevant input market.
3 Not least due to the increasing importance of that stream of the resource-based approach that
is explicitly inspired by C.K. Prahalad and Gary Hamel’s landmark contribution on “The Core
Competence of the Corporation” (1990). Here there clearly has been some attention paid to
specific types of asset-accumulation processes, namely processes of competence development,
and how these are best organized (e.g., Hamel and Heene, 1994; Heene and Sanchez, 1996).
41992) “corporate coherence” (Teece, Rumelt, Dosi and Winter, 1994), and “parent-
ing advantage” (Goold, Campbell and Alexander, 1994) is representative of such
attempts to rationalize divisionalized, multiproduct firms.   Underlying all
these notions is - implicitly or explicitly - a notion of synergy between busi-
nesses as an important rationale for the diversified corporation.
Synergy is a concept that is so fraught with different meanings that one is
excused in thinking that it is better to avoid it completely in favor of more pre-
cise concepts.  However, it is well-established in strategy thinking, and, more
importantly, has a number of important connotations that are not fully cap-
tured by more narrow concepts, such as economies of scope.  Moreover, the
concept has been at the core of resource-based thinking at least since Edith Pen-
rose’s (1959) seminal contribution. More specifically, Penrose (1959) was con-
cerned with two forms of synergy (she did not use the exact word, though) -
namely what may be called asset sharing, which is brought about due to inevi-
table indivisibilities of resources, and asset transfer, particularly transfer of as-
sets in excess (of which excess managerial resources interested Penrose the
most).  In an often-quoted contribution, Michael Porter (1987) contended that
these are basically the only kinds of synergy available to firms.  However, we
argue that there is more to synergy than Porter’s classification.
The perhaps dominant contemporary understanding of synergy revolves
around the concept of economies of scope, which simply refers to what econo-
mists call a “sub-additivity” in the cost function. Thus, in the two-product (a
and b) case, economies of scope exist when   C (a, b) < C (a) + C (b) (e.g. Teece,
1982). Of course, this is a purely formal definition and says nothing per se about
the underlying factors or mechanisms that actually  cause the sub-additivity in
the cost-function. The normal presumption, however, is that economies of
scope stem from some type of shared physical equipment. Thus, the concept is
tied, if not by logic, then by usage, to given, physical assets - obviously a rather
narrow interpretation. In order to put more flesh on the skeleton of synergy, let
5us briefly return to the contribution that actually introduced the concept to the
strategy field, namely Ansoff  (1965).
Ansoff defined synergy as a super-additivity in the return on investment
function, such that (in the two-product case), ROI (a, b) > ROI (a) + ROI (b). This
is consistent with the notion of economies of scope in the sense that these may
be underlying the sub-additivity in the return on investment function. How-
ever, clearly Ansoff’s definition is broader, the obvious difference being that his
understanding of synergy is concerned with more than the cost of production,
even when production is defined in a broad sense. In other words, costs are
only part of the equation (ROI=(R-C/I)). Whereas economies of scope are about
the reduced costs of joint production (i.e. asset sharing) vis á vis separate pro-
duction, synergies are also about increasing revenue and reducing the level of
investment needed for expansion.
Although increased revenue may be the effect of economies of scope if
(part of) the cost reduction is used to reduce selling prices, thus will only be the
case if the price elasticity of demand is sufficiently high to offset the lower price
per product. Increased revenue through lower prices also requires that the eco-
nomies of scope can be obtained without congestion since production volume
has to be increased. Reducing the necessary level of investment in the intro-
duction of new products can be obtained by sharing uncongestioned resources.
However, economies of scope based on shared physical equipment or financial
resources (as in Williamson’s (1975) M-form hypothesis) will lead to congestion
because these resources have fixed capacities, and firms cannot expand their
stocks of such assets instantly (Dierickx and Cool, 1989).
Furthermore, economies of scope based on generic physical equipment or
financial resources can be easily imitated by competitors, and will therefore
only lead to short term advantages. If the assets are strategic4, sharing will lead
                                               
4 Strategic assets are defined as “assets that underpin a firm’s cost or differentiation advantage
in a particular market and are imperfectly imitable, imperfectly substitutable, and imperfectly
tradable” (Markides and Williamson, 1996: 341).
6to sustainable competitive advantage if the strategic assets have excess capacity.
An example of such an asset amortization advantage (Markides and Williamson,
1994) is Black & Decker’s portfolio of small electrical motors used in a variety
of end products (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990). However, congestion is still likely
to happen when the shared resources are either tangible or financial, while in-
tangible resources have expandable capacity (Itami and Roehl, 1987). A special
class of intangible resources are core competences which among their defining
characteristics have the potential to bring competitive advantage in multiple
markets (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990). Markides and Williamson (1994) have de-
scribed three ways of obtaining synergy from core competencies:
· Asset improvement: the potential to use a core competence accumulated in the
course of building or maintaining a strategic asset in one business unit to
help improve an existing strategic asset in another business unit. Unilever
provides an example of a multibrand company that can utilize its skills and
experiences acquired in the process of building new brandnames to help
maintaining existing brandnames.
· Asset creation: the potential to utilize a core competence developed through
the experience of building strategic assets in existing businesses to create a
new asset in a new business. An example would the ability of Honda to
utilize its competencies in establishing dealerships for its motorcycles to es-
tablish dealerships for its automobiles division.
· Asset fission: the potential for the process of related diversification to expand
a corporation’s existing pool of core competencies because, as it builds stra-
tegic assets in a new business, it will learn new skills that in turn will allow
it to improve the existing assets in existing businesses. For instance, Canon
may have acquired new skills in electronics, optics or manufacturing when it
was building its laserprinter-business, which were also useful in improving
performance of the photocopier-business.
7Markides and Williamson (1994) thus introduce a more dynamic view of
synergy than can be contained from the concept of economies of scope, a view
that is concerned with the diversified corporation’s advantages in asset accu-
mulation processes relative to a specialized firm.
B. Synergy as Complementarities Between Assets
The attraction of using the concept of economies of scope to address the fuzzy
concept of synergy obviously lies in its well-defined nature.  However, there is
another well-defined concept from economics that is broader and better cap-
tures, for example, Ansoff’s understanding of synergy as  referring to a prop-
erty of the return on investment function.  This is the concept of complementarity
- a concept that has been seen as a key dimension of competitive advantage
(Porter, 1996).
An example of complementarity may be  a shared distribution network
for complementary products, where the convenience (e.g. reduced search and
negotiation costs or increased utility) for the customer in bundling his pur-
chases gives him an incentive to buy from a single supplier rather than using
multiple suppliers.  The keywords here are “complementary products”, be-
cause shared distribution of unrelated products might reduce costs due to
economies of scope in handling the products or economies of scale in increased
storage or display space. The complementarity (or fit) consist in the buyer’s in-
centive to bundle his purchases because the products are interconnected in
some way.
More complex forms of complementarity obtain when accumulating more
of one stock of assets increases the returns from accumulating more of another
stock of assets and vice versa (Milgrom and Roberts, 1995).5 This form of syn-
                                               
5 This definition, like Milgrom and Robert’s original notion of complementarity, may seem so-
mewhat narrow because of the symmetry requirement: “Note that complementarity is symme-
tric: If doing more of activity a raises the value of increases in activity b, then increasing b also
raises the value of increasing a” (Milgrom and Roberts 1995: 183). Depending on the definition
of symmetry, this could be taken to mean that the increases in value have to be numerically
similar, if certain activities were to be termed complementary. This seems to be a too narrow
8ergy require that asset stocks are mutually supporting, as when strong brand
names are reinforced by R&D and manufacturing departments dedicated to
maintaining productdifferentiation.  Underlying this may be the phenomenon
which Dierickx and Cool (1989) refer to as “asset-stock interconnectedness”,
that is, the accumulation of one stock (e.g., R&D knowledge) feeds on the ac-
cumulation of another stock (e.g., marketing knowledge) and vice versa.  This
may also be connected to Markides and Williamson’s (1994) analysis, which
shows that learning from the process of asset accumulation may ease the
maintenance or improvement of other assets.
C. Synergy and Sustained Competitive Advantage
The concept of complementarity can thus enrich the concept of synergy. A
further attraction is that complementarity links up with the issue of
sustainability of competitive advantage.   Dierickx and Cool (1989) isolated five
mechanisms that influence the sustainability of competitive advantage, namely
· Time compression diseconomies, which exists when a given level of expenditure
over a particular period of time produces a larger increment in asset stock
than the same level over a shorter period of time. Crash R&D-programs un-
dertaken to catch up with competitors will, in the absence of imitation op-
portunity,  require more resources, than programs spread over longer peri-
ods of time.
· Asset mass efficiencies, which exists when adding to an existing asset stock is
facilitated by possessing high levels of that stock. Thus gaining shelf-space
or or access to new distribution channels will be easier for an established
                                                                                                                                         
conception of the complementarity effect for practical purposes. It also eliminates the possible
substitution of the synergy concept for the complementarity concept, since synergy is not con-
ditioned on symmetry. Of the four kinds of synergy mentioned by Markides and Williamson
only asset amortization can be said to imply symmetry, while the others - asset improvement,
asset creation and asset fission doesn’t, because utilizing the capabilities obtained from deve-
loping an asset in one business unit to build or improve an asset in another business unit do-
esn’t enhance the original asset. Thus increasing the stock of asset b does not increase the value
of increasing the stock of asset a, although it may strengthen the asset-improving or asset-
building capability through learning and amortize the costs of developing that capability.
9company, than for a newcomer, because they can demonstrate success of
their products.
· Asset stock erosion, which occur in the absence of adequate expenditure in
maintaining the asset stock. With investments in long-lived, dedicated assets,
a company can show its determination to stay in that business and deter en-
try from potential competitors.
· Asset stock interconnectedness, which exists when adding to an existing asset
stock depends not just on the level of that stock, but also on the level of other
stocks. A servicenetwork may facilitate new product development by grant-
ing access to consumer experiences and wishes. Likewise, a service-network
may be a condition for building a reputation for high quality.
· Causal ambiguity, which exists when it is impossible to identify or control the
variables leading to the accumulation of the assets. The success of the Sony
walkman may be attributed a wide variety of causes, the insight of Akio Mo-
rita, the concurrent inside development of both earphones and portable tape-
recorders, Sony’s dealer-network being able to provide fast feedback on con-
sumer reactions and preferences etc. The large number of possible, and pos-
sibly intertwined, causes of success makes it difficult for competitors to
know which asset stocks to imitate in order to erode Sony’s competitive ad-
vantage in product innovation.
It is our contention here that time compression diseconomies, asset mass
efficiencies and asset stock interconnectedness are different manifestations of
complementarities/synergies. Moreover, none of them would seem to be ade-
quately described by the concept of economies of scope.
The preceding discussion also implies that although synergy has usually
been discussed in connection with diversification studies and corporate strat-
egy more generally, it is also important in connection with competitive strat-
10
egy.6 Thus, one way of earning rents (i.e., achieving competitive advantage) is
through generating and exploiting synergies between the different assets and
activities of the firm.  This is because synergies by definition implies a more ef-
ficient use of resources compared to non-synergistic use of the same resources.
Such an advantage in efficiency, however, can only be sustainable if imitability
of the synergistic activities is impaired by the above mechanisms, for example,
time compression diseconomies (e.g., due to the longevity of cooperative rela-
tionships between business units) or asset stock interconnectedness and causal
ambiguities (due to the diversity of the assets involved and the complexity of
the ways in which they link).
Application of the resource-based approach (Barney, 1986, 1991; Grant,
1991; Peteraf, 1993) implies that gaining competitive through synergy-
exploitation requires that the relevant assets are
· valuable in the intended applications;
· rare and inimitable, that is, inaccessible for competitors on all the relevant
markets;
· the asset is very hard for competitors to substitute;
· the asset must have limited tradeability, that is, the costs to selling excess capa-
city outside the firm must exceed the costs of internal transfer, or otherwise
the firm will be better off selling excess capacity to other firms and avoiding
the costs of coordinating internal sharing or transfer.
D. Merging the Concepts
To sum up, there are several competing concepts describing the possible bene-
fits of a diversified corporation possessing a coherent portfolio of assets relative
                                               
6  In general, the resource-based literature has been characterized by a rather strict dichotomi-
zation of research themes: there is research in the conditions of sustained competitive advan-
tage (e.g., Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993), and there is research in efficient diversification (e.g.,
Rumelt, 1974).  While this partitioning of research themes may be convenient, the two themes
are in reality very closely intertwined (Wernerfelt, 1984; Montgomery and Wernerfelt, 1988;
Markides and Williamson, 1994; Christensen and Foss, 1996).
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to a more specialized firm.  The above discussion has demonstrated some of the
differences and similarities between the partially overlapping concepts of syn-
ergy, economies of scope and complementarity.  The major similarity between
the concepts is that they all, in part, can be explained by the possibility of joint
production in certain processes.
Joint production does not, however, explain all of the benefits to the di-
versified corporation. The concept of economies of scope includes other forms
of sharing of mutual assets which are not cases of joint production, but is itself
not a sufficient explanation for the synergy effect, since the concept of synergy
is broader.  The most important limitation to Ansoff’s (1965) concept of synergy
is that it does not encompass complementarities between investments and ac-
tivities that are sequential in time or order of execution.  These effects are cov-
ered in the concept of complementarity, where complementarity over time ob-
tains when “...investments at different points in time are mutually comple-
mentary, so higher early investments increase the pace of later investments”
(Milgrom and Roberts, 1995: 187).
We think that it is both possible and necessary to merge these competing
concepts, which differ in important respects.   The following taxonomy cap-
tures, we believe, the various notions of synergies that we have discussed:
· Horizontal synergies - where the relevant synergies arise between related
businesses that performs activities based on assets that are either shared or
where the accumulation of assets in the businesses is a reinforcing process.
This category includes both economies of scope and complementarities.
· Vertical synergies - where the relevant synergies arise within a single line of
business as synergies between complementary activities.
· Timing synergies  - where the relevant synergies arise as a result of future in-
vestments benefiting from past investments, that is, intertemporal comple-
mentarities are involved.
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We will later further illustrate and discuss these different types of syner-
gies in the context of some case vignettes; for the moment, however, we will be
more concerned with the issue of how these different synergies are organized.
We cannot expect them to simply emerge. Thus, we here take the position that
synergies have to be created, that processes of synergy creation have to be
sponsored and coordinated, and that the CHQ has a crucial role to play here.
III. The Corporate Headquarters as Sponsors  of Synergies 
A. Corporate Headquarters in the Literature
Diversified, divisionalized companies consist of businesses, which could con-
ceptually exist as separate legal entities, and of a corporate hierarchy of line
managers and staff outside these businesses, here called the corporate headquar-
ters (CHQ).  Generally, the CHQ include functions that coordinate activities
across business units.  We here follow Chandler (1994) in thinking of the CHQ
as also including top-management.
Apart from the theoretically trivial role of meeting statutory obligations,
what essentially is the role of the CHQ? This question would seem to have be-
come increasingly topical, as restructuring of CHQ has become an important
managerial concern.  The conventional answer to the question is that the CHQ
undertakes basically two overall functions.  The first is that it undertakes long-
run strategic planning; the second one is that it engages in more administrative
or loss-preventing functions, such as monitoring the performance of individual
divisions (Chandler, 1994: 327).  More specifically, the CHQ determines corpo-
rate strategy, and steer the implementation and carrying out of corporate strat-
egy by influencing managers in business units, by making choices among in-
vestment and by acquiring and divesting business in the horizontal and vertical
dimensions.  Moreover, the CHQ determines organizational structure, carry out
financial control, and determine hurdle rates.
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Implicit in these answers is that the CHQ function creates value - and in
fact exists on account of this (Foss, 1997).  But how specifically is value created?
One possible, but somewhat awkward, answer turning on the second main task
of the CHQ is that it creates value by preventing loss.  That is to say, the CHQ’s
function and rationale lie in some superior ability to avoid losses.   In a sense,
this a negative view of the function and rationale of the CHQ: they exist because
they hinder something, such as morally hazardous behavior (Holmström, 1982;
Miller, 1992).
Another answer - more in the positive vein - is that the CHQ’s function
and rationale may rather turn on its ability to create value through its strategic
leadership.  This is here taken to imply more than setting the overall goals for
corporate activities.  Specifically, exercising strategic leadership is here taken to
include engaging in such diverse value-creating activities as seeing to that
economies of scope are exploited, reshuffling assets across divisions and func-
tions, the building of teams, imbuing employees with a corporate ethos, trans-
ferring knowledge, furthering organizational learning in other ways, etc.
This is a large number of tasks, and for the sake of the clarity of the dis-
cussion, we need to provide a more narrow menu of what it is that the CHQ
may accomplish. Luckily such a menu has been provided already. According to
Campbell, Goold and Alexander (1994: 78), there are four basic ways in which
the CHQ may create value through its ability to effect various types of influ-
ences on the divisions/strategic business units.   These are: Stand-alone influ-
ence, linkage influence, functional and services influence, and corporate devel-
opment activities.   We define and exemplify these in the following.
Stand-alone influence refers to the situation in which the parent enhances
the stand-alone performance of the business units. Examples from Campbell et
al. (1994) include the company Dover, which exerts stand alone influence
through appointing senior managers; BTR, which emphasizes budgetary con-
trol; Emerson, which uses it strategy review process to create value; and RTZ,
14
which brings value through infrequent, but large capital investments in its
mining businesses.
Linkage influence obtains when the parent enhances the value of linkages
between the business units.  This type of influence spans several different ap-
proaches ranging from incouraging, but not demanding, cooperation between
autonomous businesses to developing elaborate network/matrix structures and
centralized pools of resources drawn from and added to by individual busi-
nesses. Thus the mechanisms uses to generate this kind of influence range from
transfer of best practices between individual units as in the bank holding com-
pany Banc One to the more elaborate building of cross-product group linkages
in Unilever through building networks and lateral relationships between man-
agers in different businesses, by retaining tight control over career management
and promotion decisions and by influencing strategy development. Examples
of the network/matrix structure way of exerting linkage influence are the way
that ABB and Hewlett Packard have arranged for each profit center to be part
of both a regional/geographical company and a global business area structure.
Under functional and services influence the parent provides functional lead-
ership and cost effective services for the business units. In 3M a central techni-
cal function helps identifying and developing technical directors and managing
an audit process for the company’s 150 laboratories. Likewise, The Royal
Dutch/Shell Group have central functions ranging from finance, legal, human
resources and research, to its famous scenario planning unit who pioneered this
approach.
Finally, through corporate development activities the CHQ creates value by
altering the composition of the portfolio of business units.  This can be achieved
by combining smaller companies into a larger unit achieving economies of
scale/scope as GE does in its strategy of making each of its businesses one the
largest in its industry, or by splitting businesses to achieve greater focus as
done by ABB and BTR.  Adding new business areas to exploit excess capacities
15
can be achieved by the CHQ through corporate product-development depart-
ments or by combining hitherto autonomous product areas to produce inte-
grated products. Included in corporate development activities are assistance in
the process of acquisition and divestment of businesses as succesfully done by
Hanson Trust.
Clearly, these modes of influence relate to our previous discussion of syn-
ergies.  They describe the processes through which the CHQ may stimulate
synergies.  For example, linkage influence means stimulating latent economies
of scope or complementarities.
B.  Promoting  Horizontal, Vertical and Timing Synergies Through CHQ
Activities
Based on the discussion in section two we suggested a three-dimensional
taxonomy for analyzing opportunities for synergy. Specifically, we distinguish
between horizontal, vertical and timing synergies.
The first type of synergy, called horizontal synergies, obtains between par-
allel activities in different business units (e.g. between distribution of product a
and distribution of product b). This kind of synergy has received the widest
attention in the economics literature, namely under the rubric of economies of
scope and usually referring to shared physical resources like machines, tools,
buildings and other fixed, indivisible investments. Other examples include a
shared salesforce or sharing administrative functions like accounting and hu-
man resource management.
Recent literature has introduced the concepts of core products (Prahalad
and Hamel, 1990) and product platforms (Meyer and Utterback, 1992) which
are physical and technological resources that can be shared between different
end-products. Although these examples are among the opportunities for syn-
ergy that are arguably easiest to recognize, they also seems the hardest to sus-
tain because they apparently reduce the firm’s sourcing and operating flexibil-
ity more than the sharing of competencies, because changes on behalf of one
16
internal customer might be resisted by the others (Mahajan and Wind, 1988;
Prahalad and Doz, 1992). In other words the outputs of shared activities be-
comes the least common denominator of the requirements of the units sharing
the activity.
Some horizontal synergies are similar to the benefits of what Campbell et
al. (1994) call linkage influence. The CHQ promotes this kind of synergy through
the design of its sourcing policies, transfer pricing mechanisms, cross-unit task
forces, reward and recognition systems, staff rotation, central policies or guide-
lines, arbitration processes, central experts, and fora to encourage information
sharing and straightforward information exchanges.  Porter (1985: 394) divides
the mechanisms for achieving horizontal synergies into four broad categories:
1. Horizontal structures, which are organizational devices that cut across
business, such as grouping of business units, partial centralization, in-
terdivisional task forces and committees.
2. Horizontal systems. Management systems with a cross business unit
dimension in areas such as planning, control, incentives and capital
budgeting.
3. Horizontal human resource practices that facilitate business unit coopera-
tion such as cross business unit job rotation, and corporate management
fora and training programs.
4. Horizontal conflict resolution processes.
 The second type of synergy, vertical synergy, consists of synergies between
complementary assets contributing to a single line of business. These are either
synergies between sequential or successive activities, or synergies between
competencies that contribute to the same activity. When all the relevant assets
for achieving vertical synergy is under the control of divisional management,
the role of CHQ must be to provide strong incentives for their efficient utiliza-
tion. In other situations, complementary assets also has to be shared with other
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divisions, and their use must therefore be coordinated by the CHQ (we explain
this point later).
Both stand-alone influence and functional and services influence in the termi-
nology of Campbell et al. (1994) can assist in the creation of vertical synergies.
For example, the CHQ may develop and diffuse different techniques which in-
crease operational efficiency through the training of SBU-managers and
through establishing advisement groups.  The CHQ also exert influence on di-
visions by imposing centrally developed methods and procedures in, for ex-
ample, budgeting and financial reporting.  The role of the CHQ in appointing
the general manager and their influence on management development and suc-
cession planning also affect divisional strategies, as do the ways in which CHQ
approve or reject budgets, strategic plans and capital expenditure proposals or
influence the shape and implementation hereof.
Finally, we see a third dimension consisting of synergies between activi-
ties that are carried out at different points in time, but are mutually beneficial
because the later activities exploits learning from past activities.  Some of these
timing synergies have the properties of real options (Sanchez, 1993) because divi-
sions have the opportunity, but not the obligation, to further develop the assets
of the corporate center to fit the needs of their own businesses.  Business units
may for instance defer investing in new technologies if the technologies are
being monitored by a central R&D-lab which can transfer experts and patent
rights to any unit which might require it.  Likewise, central functions can pro-
vide extra manpower to business unit projects during emergencies.
Having a pool of deployable resources for unforeseen contingencies is an
important advantage for the multi-product firm because the costs can be amor-
tized between all business units instead of being carried by the single business
area of the specialized firm.  In Milgrom and Robert’s view (1992: 107) core
competencies are a sort of shared input to products that does not yet exist, and
thus constitutes a timing synergy.  Most other durable investments, both physi-
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cal and intangible, whose duration exceeds the life span of the corporation’s
individual products are a source of timing synergy if they bring more value to
the products than generic inputs.
Thus, the CHQ may, through its central staff, ease the entry into new
markets by undertaking market and technological research that can be used by
different divisions.   The existence of time compression diseconomies (Dierickx
and Cool, 1989) implies that the CHQ may avoid destroying value by relaxing
rigorous control systems and providing guarantees for adequate funding of
long-term projects.  Corporate development activities which reshuffles the
composition of businesses may also be a source of timing synergy by rejuve-
nating mature divisions through allocation of ventures developed elsewhere
and/or refocusing cluttered divisions by removing responsibility for new
ventures which are unrelated to existing activities (Galunic and Eisenhardt,
1996).
 IV. Managing Synergies in two large Danish Companies
This section illustrates the distinction between horizontal, vertical and timing
synergies that was presented in the following section, and discuss how the
CHQ in two large Danish industrial companies, Danfoss and Bang & Olufsen,
were instrumental in creating these synergies.7
Danfoss is a world-leading manufacturer of certain types of hydraulics,
intelligent refrigeration systems, radiatorthermostats and compressors and
thermostats for refrigerators. The company employs about 17,000 people
worldwide and a turnover of about 2 billion US$.  Danfoss has adopted an M-
form organization structure with ten product-divisions divided between three
“product-families” (groups of divisions). Danfoss has an extensive network of
coordination committees, a comprehensive on-line database of stan-
                                               
7  It is partly based on Iversen and Christensen (1996a&b).
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dards/policies covering many aspects of day-to-day operations, and some
CHQ-involvement in the strategy-planning process of the divisions.
In the present paper, Bang & Olufsen refers to the audio-visual division of
Bang & Olufsen Holding Ltd., which accounts for approximately 90% of the
corporation’s annual turnover. This division is a consumer-electronics company
with about 2.500 employees and an annual turnover of about 0.5 billion US$.
Bang & Olufsen is mostly known for the aesthetic design of its audio-visual-
products,8 although Bang & Olufsen has also introduced many technical inno-
vations.9 Bang & Olufsen is a U-form organization organized in three depart-
ments: Operations, Business Development and Sales/marketing. Bang & Oluf-
sen Holding Ltd. is mostly a holding company (H-form) type of organization
with very limited CHQ intervention and the audio-visual division assuming
the role of parent to the other four subsidiaries/affiliates of the holding com-
pany10.
A. Horizontal synergies
We defined horizontal synergies as synergies between parallel and similar ac-
tivities in different business units. We also noted that these synergies appar-
ently reduce the firm’s operating flexibility more than the sharing of competen-
cies.
The difficulty in sustaining this kind of synergy may be illustrated by the
experiences of Danfoss and Bang & Olufsen, both of which have plants that
manufacture and supply components to different product lines. In recent years
the strategies of both companies have been to outsource components to outside
suppliers, except those that differentiate their products from the competitors.
                                               
8 Of which several are on permanent display at the Museum of Modern Art in New York.
9 Among their most notable technical innovations stand the worlds first transistorized amplifi-
er, the worlds first stereo pick-up and, more recently, the invention of HX Professional, which
have become standard in Dolby™ noise reduction systems.
10 The subsidiaries/affiliates include Bang & Olufsen Technology (medical utensils), Bang &
Olufsen Telecom (telephones), Ericsson Diax (telephone switchboards), and Beologic (compu-
ter-software).
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Danfoss has furthermore also decentralized the manufacture of compo-
nents so that each of the ten product divisions produce more of their own com-
ponents and fewer are procured from the centralized plants. Likewise Danfoss’
central procurement department was decentralized in 1988 and the divisions
assumed responsibility for their own purchases.  In the beginning of 1997, all
manufacture of components has been transferred to the product divisions.
In 1988 Bang & Olufsen formed a subsidiary, Bang & Olufsen Technol-
ogy11, that was meant to develop and manufacture new products on behalf of
other companies. The new company was expected to utilize the parent com-
pany’s resources in manufacturing and R&D when they were in excess, typi-
cally because of seasonal changes in the demand for the parent company’s
audiovisual products. This idea was soon abandoned because of coordination
problems (e.g., priority of access to resources) and the new company got its
own staff and facilities. Today, Bang & Olufsen Technology primarily benefit
from its relations to Bang & Olufsen through sharing their purchasing network
and the company’s reputation.
Other kinds of horizontal synergy are the types of synergy described by
Markides and Williamson (1994) (as summarized in section IIA), which Dan-
foss tries to obtain by inventing new coordination mechanisms.  One such me-
chanism is what is called in the firm “the technology pyramid”, and which de-
scribes the competencies, skills and technologies that are in corporate-wide use.
A gatekeeper is assigned to each one of these competencies, skills and tech-
nologies.  He is responsible for the development of the relevant assets, for sur-
veying developments by other companies and research institutions, and for co-
operating with other companies and research institutions in the technological
field to which the relevant assets belong.  The work of the gatekeeper is moni-
tored by a committee with members from different divisions.
                                               
11 Now a subsidiary of Bang & Olufsen Holding Ltd.
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In Bang & Olufsen, the amortization of technological competencies is ac-
complished by adopting a so-called network-organization in the R&D depart-
ment, where the technicians and engineers work on various projects based on
their technical - rather than product - area of expertise. In this way an expert in
the design of loudspeakers can work on developing both separate loudspeakers
and speakers for use in televisions, telephones or portable equipment and
thereby increase his or her specialization to the benefit of different product
lines that can share that person’s skill. An example is the development of the
Beosystem 2500 which was the first integrated integrated stereosystem that
employed “active” loudspeakers12. This development of competency in active
loudspeaker technology subsequently led to the development of a whole range
of active loudspeakers and the technology was also used in television sets.
Danfoss also realize synergy by having complementary product lines like
valves, thermostats and compressors which are all targeted at producers of re-
frigerators. Danfoss’ two sales divisions are independent from the product di-
visions so they can combine products from them with complementary products
from other companies and resell these products along with products manufac-
tured by Danfoss.13 In fact, a key part of Danfoss’ strategy is to develop com-
plementary products and acquire companies whose products are complemen-
tary to the existing product lines. Thus, Danfoss has also formed so-called
“product families” (groups of divisions), which is a new hierarchical layer de-
signed to develop business areas that fill the gaps between the existing prod-
uct/market areas of the divisions.
Bang & Olufsen also achieves this kind of synergy by developing prod-
ucts that work as integrated systems. For instance, their remote controls can
control both audio and video products, so only one remote control to use the
                                               
12 Active loudspeaker are loudspeakers with separate amplifiers for each of their drive units,
for example,  bass and treble.
13 The sales subsidiaries are not allowed to sell the products from outside supplier under the
Danfoss brand and the products have to live up to Danfoss’ quality standards.
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TV, VCR and stereo system is needed (provided all these  are Bang & Olufsen-
products). Likewise the fact that customers can buy a full system of Bang &
Olufsen-products may increase the customer’s perceived value of the individ-
ual products because of the aesthetic and functional connectedness between the
products.  Systems integration is coordinated by a designated technology chief
with responsibility for product compatibility.
B. Vertical synergies
Vertical synergies defined as synergies between sequential or successive activi-
ties in a value chain.   We illustrate these with referece to Bang & Olufsen’s suc-
cess in creating a audio-visual products with an appealing aesthetic design.
This reputation is not just the result of a superior aesthetic design capability; in
fact, the aesthetic design of their products are made by independent designers.
Bang & Olufsen themselves ascribe the success of their products to the combi-
nation of six complementary competencies:
· A superior capability in developing the electronic circuitry to fit the design-
ers ideas.
· Competencies in materials technology and mechanics (especially product
surfaces).
· A competence in developing systems with high quality in sound reproduc-
tion based on insights in psychoacoustics and a specially trained group of
listeners (internal lead users).
· A competence in developing systems with high quality in image reproduc-
tion based on research in quality attributes in image reproduction and a spe-
cially trained group of viewers (internal lead users).
· A functional application competence in developing new ways of operating
the products.
· A competence in developing integrated systems that works in different
rooms in the home (link-systems).
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The combination of these complementary competencies helps Bang & Oluf-
sen to create products that are perceived as unique by most people; it is funda-
mentally what gives the firm its differentiation advantage.  It is achieved
through cross-functional work-groups in the concept-development stage of new
product development.  The members of these groups come from the manufac-
turing, marketing and business development departments and meet to assure
that suggestions for new products meet the requirements for manufacturing
and marketing before entering the development stage.
In the beginning of the 1990s, Bang & Olufsen developed a new strategy
named “Break Point 93” making the year 1993 a turning point after years of un-
satisfactory financial performance.  This new strategy for Bang & Olufsen con-
tained three complementary key objectives.  The first objective was to reduce
the fixed costs in order to eliminate the losses sustained when demand is low
due to cyclical fluctuations.  This was accomplished through out-sourcing the
manufacturing of non-critical components and developing a leaner organiza-
tion with fewer hierarchical layers and delegating responsibility to 125 newly
created autonomous work-groups.  The second objective was to create more so-
called “breakthrough”-products which were ahead of competitors products on
a number of selected criteria.  This was accomplished through a reorganization
of the product development department leading to the concept of the “network
organization” previously described and a new product strategy involving a
broader product portfolio with fewer variants of the individual products.
The third objective was to improve the quality of the distribution which
was accomplished by improving logistics through the use of EDI (Electronic
Data Interchange), connecting both suppliers and retailers to the computer
systems at Bang & Olufsen. Bang & Olufsen also conducted a screening of re-
tailers, which resulted in the “dismissal” of more than 700 retailers  The 2.400
remaining and new retailers are offered training by Bang & Olufsen, who also
provides special concepts for displaying their products.
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The complementarities between these activities undertaken to fulfill the
three objectives have given Bang & Olufsen three consecutive years of record-
breaking profits and turned Bang & Olufsen into one of the world’s most suc-
cessful manufacturers of consumer electronics.
It may be doubted whether fulfilling any of these objectives in isolation
would have created equally remarkable results, since the creation of more
“breakthrough”-products made it more desirable for the retailers to carry Bang
& Olufsen-products, which put Bang & Olufsen in the position of being able to
make higher demands on the retailers.  Likewise, the reduction in fixed costs
made it possible for Bang & Olufsen to be profitable, even if the reduction in
the number of retailers had made the revenue fall.  The leaner organization
made possible by the changed product strategy of fewer product variants and
closer cooperation with suppliers and dealers gave Bang & Olufsen the ability
to offer products at competitive prices despite significant scale disadvantages
compared to their much bigger competitors like Sony, Philips and Mat-
shushita.14 This wolud not have been achieved without increased mutual ad-
justment made possible by department heads beeing members of the board of
directors and thus part of the team developing and agreeing on the “Break
Point 93”-plan.  On the tactical level, the cross-functional work-groups in prod-
uct-concept development assure that the demands of all departments are met.
C. Timing synergies
Finally, we see a third dimension consisting of synergies between activities that
are carried out at different points in time, but are mutually beneficial because
the later activities exploits learning from past activities. Some of these timing
synergies have the properties of real options because business units have the op-
                                               
14 The market for consumer electronics is very price sensitive, which means that even compa-
nies with a differentiation advantage such as Bang & Olufsen can only obtain a modest premi-
um on their products compared to products with the same basic specifications such as screen-
size on TV’s and maximum power rating on amplifiers.
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portunity, but not the obligation, to further develop the assets of the corporate
center to fit the needs of their own businesses.
Like most diversified corporations, Danfoss has a central research organi-
zation called Corporate Technology and Research (CTR). CTR conducts projects
with a time horizon of 4-5 years that can either be directly used in one or more
of the ten product divisions or provide options for new ventures. The results of
the research projects are diffused throughout the entire organization through
direct contacts and a variety of committees and technology councils. When a
new venture project has reached a mature state, it has to be transferred to a di-
vision that is willing to assume responsibility for developing the venture. Bang
& Olufsen also provide options for assessing technologies for the other subsidi-
aries in the holding company through their research and their contacts with
suppliers.
Another type of timing synergy is evident in Bang & Olufsen, where the
development department has conducted a series of consecutive development
programs to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of the organization. They
started with creating the basic premises for the network organization by di-
viding the departments management responsibilities between managers of
product development projects and managers of technology development proj-
ects. The following development programs consisted of developing a project-
oriented organization, eliminating one of the hierarchical layers, substituting
the product-based departments with departments based on technological com-
petencies. These programs were followed by a program focusing on increasing
the hit-rate of development projects by introducing a series of measurement-
techniques, which led to an improvement in for instance the rate of projects
completed on-time from 10% to 90%.
The next program reduced the number of customer complaints to 1/8 of
the previous level through focusing on improving product quality. After that,
the development department conducted programs identifying and strengthen-
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ing their key competencies, a program leading to ISO9001-certification and a
Business Process Reengineering-program that reduced the length of the average
development project from 127 weeks to 72 weeks. The latest programs are con-
cerned with mapping of product-technologies, increasing the ability to adopt
new technologies and developing a five-year plan for the product-development
activities.
These consecutive projects are complementary because they add to and
complement the skills developed in previous programs and thus provides a
continuous and incremental enhancement of the competencies of the develop-
ment department. The programs are probably also associated with time com-
pression diseconomies (Dierickx and Cool, 1989), which makes it difficult for
competitors to catch up.
V. Concluding Discussion
Our primary aim in this paper has been to help placing the issue of how the
CHQ may initiate and coordinate processes of synergy creation on the agenda
of strategy researchers.  We have not provided a finely honed theory; rather,
we have put forward a number of concepts and (hopefully) clarifying discus-
sions, and indicated how a number of hitherto independently developing lit-
eratures may make contact.   Our framework may be illustrated as i figure 1.
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The main point of the diagram is that the CHQ through various activities
may create synergies that translate into rents.  To the extent that these rents are
hard to imitate, they tranlate into sustained rents.  It is the ability to generate
such rents that we argue is the primary raison d’etre of the CHQ.
However, we have left many issues open.   Specifically, our main issue,
the role of the CHQ in fostering synergies, requires much more research.  Our
own examples suggest that the CHQ primarily promotes synergy by mandat-
ing communication and mutual adaptation across departmental boundaries at
all levels of an organisation. Sometimes special structures have to be invented
as in the cases of the network-organization in Bang & Olufsen or the Technol-
ogy Pyramid and Product Families of Danfoss.
While we believe our discussion has raised pertinent issues and have
given some (albeit tentative) answers, it may be criticized in many ways. For
example, it may be read as a ringing endorsement of strong and detailed top-
down direction on the part of top-management.  This is clearly at variance with
much contemporary thinking on the learning organization, team and project
organization, bottom-up perspectives, and much else.  We do not believe our
discussion necessarily implies a naï ve endorsement of top-down management.
However, while synergies may be imagined to develop spontaneously, we
maintain that this is not generally the case and that involvement on the part of
the CHQ will normally be necessary as demonstrated by our examples.
Coordination by the CHQ will for instance be necessary when the benefits
of cooperation is unevenly distributed between cooperating business units and
especially when achieving benefit for the whole corporation involves loss of
opportunity and/or autonomy or even increased costs for individual divisions.
Also, decentralized decision-making work poorly to the extent that the optimal
resource allocation significantly depends on the use of knowledge that is not given
to lower-level personnel (such as business unit managers) (Milgrom and Roberts,
1992: 92). Organizational restructuring, new product launches, the stimulation of
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inter-divisional knowledge flows, etc. are examples of design problems with an in-
novation attribute (ibid.). These problems favor intensive knowledge flows and
some extent of centralized control.
Another critique is that we have not paid attention to incentive issues. This is
certainly a justified critique, and future work will take this into account. The perti-
nence of the critique becomes clear when it is realized that creating, for example,
horizontal synergies amounts to making the firm more team-like.15 And since Al-
chian and Demsetz (1972) and Holmström (1982), we have known that team-
production is a potential cover for shirking.  Per implication, fostering horizontal
synergies may mean that monitoring becomes less effective, since it becomes in-
creasingly difficult to ascertain the contributions of individual team-members, for
example, divisional managers.  Thus, the cost of obtaining additional synergies
may be additional agency costs.  The demands which the different types of syn-
ergy poses on CHQ appear to be conflicting when considering the incentive ef-
fects because horizontal synergies may require extensive CHQ involvement in
the operating decisions of divisions, while timing synergies require more ex-
tensive divisional autonomy with CHQ-support for long-term projects and less
emphasis on tight financial control.  Tight financial control on the other hand
put strong pressure on divisions to maximize the efficiency and thus promotes
vertical synergies but is incommensurable with horizontal synergies because
resource sharing complicates the measurement of divisional performance.
Finally, we do not believe that synergies should be pursued at all costs.
Achieving synergy is costly for at least two important reasons.  First, coopera-
tion has to cross borders between organizational subunits, which creates incen-
tive and informational problems.  Second, creating synergies induces complex-
                                               
15 Technically, team-production is production with non-separable production functions. A result of
team-production is that it is hard, perhaps even impossible, to tell the marginal product of each
team-member. All that can (easily) be observed is team-output, and remuneration of agents have to
be on the basis of the size of their joint output. This creates incentive problems, since the effects of
reduced effort will be distributed throughout the team. The solution to this incentive problem is to
appoint an employee to monitor team-production. Moreover, in order to provide incentives for effi-
cient monitoring, the monitor should be given title to residual profit streams.
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ity because synergy is not just about long-term cooperation between fixed
units/partners. Instead synergy implies changing patterns of heuristics (capa-
bilities, routines) in identifying and establishing opportunities for synergistic
cooperation. Therefore, a strategy of synergy-pursuit require careful selection
of the activities and assets on which the synergies are based in order to avoid
the benefits being eroded by the cost of cooperation. These costs of coordina-
tion may include both costs of search, administration and mutual adaptation,
and opportunity costs due to the loss of entrepreneurial and operating flexibil-
ity inherent in trying to exploit existing resources rather than acquiring new
ones for a specific purpose.  Therefore we contend that exploitation of synergies
should be based on the assets and activities that are actual or potential sources
of sustained competitive advantage.  In other words, achieving synergy re-
quires identification of imperfectly imitable and imperfectly substitutable ac-
tivities and assets (cf. Barney, 1991, Dierickx and Cool, 1989) with sufficient
flexibility for valuable application in more than one domain.
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